Industrial Engineering and Management Systems

Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers (대한산업공학회)
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Development of a Composite Revenue Sharing-Quantity Flexibility Contract

  • Lumsakul, Pasuree (Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, School of Engineering and Technology, Asian Institute of Technology) ;
  • Luong, Huynh Trung (Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, School of Engineering and Technology, Asian Institute of Technology)
  • Received : 2013.01.31
  • Accepted : 2013.08.25
  • Published : 2013.09.30
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Abstract

In supply chain management, the supply contract can induce collaboration and coordination among the supply chain members in order to optimize supply chain performance. Numerous supply contracts have been examined; however, some difficulties related to the application of these contracts still occur. One of the solutions is to apply the composite supply contract which can assist in the supply chain coordination. This research examines the composite contract of the revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts in a two-stage supply chain, which comprises a retailer and a supplier. In this research, a mathematical model of the composite contract is developed; then, the applicability of the proposed composite contract is examined by investigating its capability in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation. In the numerical experiments, the composite revenue sharing-quantity flexibility contract showed that it is superior to both component contracts in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation among supply chain members.

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References

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