CEO Stock Incentive, Board of Directors, and the Performance of Chinese Corporations after the Stock Incentive Management Law in 2006

주식인센티브 관리법 이후 중국 상장기업 CEO주식인센티브, 이사회, 기업성과의 관계

  • Zhang, Rui-Zhi (College of Business Administration, Konkuk University) ;
  • Yoo, Jae-Wook (College of Business Administration, Konkuk University)
  • Received : 2016.07.22
  • Accepted : 2016.09.08
  • Published : 2016.09.30

Abstract

Separation of management with ownership induces the agency problems between CEO and shareholders of Chinese firms. To solve this problem Chinese government has enforced the "stock incentive management law for stock listed companies" since 2006. However, it has not been clear that this law is beneficial to reduce the agency cost and thus to increase the performance of Chinese firms. This study aims to answer this question. It is specifically designed to explore the effects of CEO's stock incentive on the performance of Chinese firms. It also examines the moderating effects of the characteristics of the board of directors on this relationship. Using a multi-year sample (2008-2014), we found that CEO's stock incentive is positively related to firm's performance. We also found that the equity stakes of board members strengthens the positive relations between CEO's equity incentives and firms' performance. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, the independency of the board of directors does not significantly moderate the relationship between CEO's equity incentives and firms' performance. Based on the findings, this study provides valuable implication for theory and practice.

소유와 경영이 분리된 기업에서는 경영자와 주주 간의 이해관계 상충으로 인한 대리인 문제가 발생될 수 있으며, 이를 해소하기 위한 지배구조체제로서 CEO에 대한 주식인센티브제도를 실행할 수 있다. 하지만 본 제도의 실효성에 대해서는 서구 기업들을 대상으로 한 연구들에서와 마찬가지로 중국기업들을 대상으로 했던 선행연구들에서도 상충되는 다양한 주장들이 제시되어 왔다. 따라서 국영기업들의 사유화를 추진해 온 중국 정부는 소유와 경영이 분리된 기업들의 대리인 문제를 보다 효과적으로 해소시키기 위하여 "상장기업 주식인센티브관리법"을 2006년부터 시행해왔다. 하지만 본 법률의 기대효과가 발생되었는지에 대해서는 아직도 명확한 답변을 하기 어려운 상황이다. 이에 본 연구에서는 2006년 법률의 시행 이후 중국 상장기업 CEO에 대한 주식인센티브제도가 기업들의 성과향상에 기여했는지, 더불어 이사회의 특성들이 CEO 주식인센티브와의 상호작용을 통해 기업성과에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지에 대한 실증분석을 실행하였다. 연구표본은 2008년부터 2013년까지의 6년의 연구기간 동안 최고경영자에 대한 주식인센티브제도를 실시한 중국 상장기업들이며, 제시된 가설들에 대한 검증을 기업성과를 종속변수로 하는 계층적 다중회귀분석을 통해 실시하였다. 연구결과에 따르면 CEO 주식인센티브와 기업성과 간에는 기대했던 것처럼 정(+)의 관계가 있는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 이사회의 지분보유는 CEO 주식인센티브와 기업성과 간의 관계를 강화시킨 것으로 나타났다. 하지만 이사회의 독립성을 나타내는 사외이사비율과 CEO/이사회의장직의 분리는 CEO 주식인센티브와의 상호작용을 통해 기업성과에 중대한 정의 영향을 미치지 않은 것으로 나타났다. 이와 같은 분석결과에 기초하여 본 논문의 결론에서는 이론적 실무적 차원의 중요한 시사점들을 제시하였다.

Keywords

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