The Complementarity of the Principal Principle and Conditionalization

주요 원리와 조건화의 상호보완성

  • Park, Ilho (Department of Philosophy, Chonbuk National University)
  • Received : 2018.07.04
  • Accepted : 2018.08.04
  • Published : 2018.10.30

Abstract

This paper is intended to examine a relationship between the Principal Principle and Conditionalization. For this purpose, I will first formulate several versions of the Principal Principle and Conditionalization in Section 2. In regard to the relationship between the two norms in question, I will show in Section 3 that the Principal Principle and Conditionalization are complementary in two particular senses. The first complementarity is that we don't have to formulate every version of the Principal Principle if the credences evolves by means of Conditionalization. The second complementarity is that we don't have to require for rational agents to update overall credal state by means of Conditionalization if the agent satisfies the Principal Principle. This result can be regarded as a result that criticizes and supplements some existing works about the relationship between the norms.

본 논문의 목표는 공시적 인식 규범인 주요 원리와 통시적 인식규범인 조건화 사이의 관계를 명시적으로 밝혀내는 것이다. 이를 위해, 나는 먼저 2절에서 주요 원리와 조건화의 여러 형태들을 정식화할 것이다. 그리고 3절에서 주요 원리와 조건화는 상호 보완적이라는 것을 논증할 것이다. 이 상호보완적 관계는 두 가지 방향에서 제시된다. 첫 번째는 조건화에 의한 주요 원리의 보완이며, 두 번째는 주요 원리에 의한 조건화의 보완이다. 첫 번째 보완관계는 조건화를 이용해 신념도를 갱신하는 경우, 특정한 형태의 주요 원리만을 만족시킨다면 모든 형태의 주요 원리를 만족시킬 수 있다는 것을 의미하며, 두 번째 보완 관계는 언제나 주요 원리를 만족하는 경우, 모든 신념도를 조건화를 통해 갱신하기 위해서는 일부 신념도만을 조건화를 통해서 갱신하는 것으로 충분하다는 것이다. 이 결과, 주요 원리와 조건화가 꽤 밀접한 관련이 있다는 것이 밝혀질 것이다.

Keywords

References

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