Journal of Industrial Convergence (산업융합연구)

DAEHAN Society of Industrial Management (대한산업경영학회)
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Effect of Reporting Earnings Strategy on Asymmetric CEO Performance-Compensation Sensitivity

보고이익전략이 비대칭적 경영자 성과-보상 민감도에 미치는 영향

  • Eun-Ju, Lee (Dept. Smart Asset Management, Busan University of Foreign Studies)
  • 이은주 (부산외국어대학교 스마트자산경영학과)
  • Received : 2022.08.16
  • Accepted : 2022.11.20
  • Published : 2022.11.28
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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the reporting earnings strategy on the relationship between managerial ability and manager performance-reward sensitivity. Both upward and downward adjustments can occur in the direction of management performance adjustment according to the manager's reporting earnings strategy. was found to decrease performance-based performance-reward sensitivity. The underreporting strategy is hypothesized that, although additional compensation is paid for the performance of the reporting strategy according to the manager's ability, the level of compensation increases, but this type of compensation will decrease the performance-reward sensitivity because this type of compensation is irrelevant to the actual performance of the manager. This is the result of indirectly confirming that discriminatory compensation is provided for upward and downward adjustment of business performance according to the reporting earnings strategy.

본 연구의 목적은 경영자의 능력과 경영자 성과-보상 민감도 간의 관련성에 보고이익전략이 미치는 조절효과를 살펴보는 것이다. 경영자의 보고이익전략에 따른 경영성과의 조정 방향은 상향조정과 하향조정 모두 발생할 수 있으며, 상향 조정과 하향 조정에 따라 경영자 보상에 미치는 영향이 차별적일 것으로 예상되어 분석한 결과, 과대보고를 위한 보고이익전략은 기대와 동일하게 상향조정 된 경영성과에 따라 보상을 지급하였으므로 성과에 근거한 차별적인 보상이 지급되지 않는 것으로 확인되었다. 반면에 과소보고를 위한 전략은 성과에 근거한 성과-보상 민감도를 감소시키는 것으로 나타났다. 과소보고전략은 경영자의 능력에 따른 보고전략의 수행에 대하여 추가적인 보상이 지급되어 보상의 수준은 증가하지만, 이러한 유형의 보상이 경영자의 실제 성과와는 무관하므로 성과-보상 민감도를 감소시킬 것이라는 가설을 지지하며, 보고이익전략에 따른 경영성과의 상향 및 하향 조정에 대해 차별적인 보상이 이루어진다는 것을 간접적으로 확인한 결과이다.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the research grant of the Busan University of Foreign Studies in 2022.

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