• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.29-39
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of blockholder presence in the Korean stock market. This study examines previous theories and studies, points that previous studies did not examine, and proposes two hypotheses. To verify two hypotheses, fundamental data were collected from firms listed on Korea Exchange from 2005 to 2017. As explanatory variables, we use the factors and characteristics of the firms used in the previous studies. Logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the determinants of blockholder presence. We find that firm size is the most distinctive factor determining the presence of blockholder, and firm idiosyncratic risk is the most similar factor determining the existence of each blockholder. Tobin Q shows significant value in family and government, and R&D intensity appears to be a negative related to the presence of blockholder in financial institutions. We also find that the determinant of blockholder presence differs from the mechanisms that govern each individual blockholder type when all blockholders grouped together. This suggests that there is blockholder heterogeneity within Korea listing firms. Our findings contribute to investors and policy makers who interested in the determinants of the presence of blockholder and blockhoder heterogeneity in Korea stock market.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.59-69
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• 2020

This study investigates the influence of individual blockholder on accounting quality. Prior studies investigating Korean blockholders' influence focus on the influence of controlling shareholders or institutional investors; however, they rarely examine individual blockholders' influence. This paper investigates how individual blockholders in Korean stock markets affect accounting quality of firms listed in Korean Stock Exchange. I analyze individual blockholders' influence on proxies of accounting quality using multivariate regression with hand-collected individual blockholder data. Korean law requires public firms to disclose the list of shareholders having no less than 5% of ownership. From the list of blockholders, individuals who have no explicit personal relation with controlling shareholders were classified as individual blockholders. My empirical results show that firms having individual blockholder(s) use more income-decreasing accruals than those having no individual blockholder. Furthermore, accounting information of firms having individual blockholders(s) is more conservative than that of firms having no individual blockholders. However, the presence of individual blockholder increases the tendency of loss avoidance and earnings management using overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenditure. This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first evidence of the monitoring role of an individual blockholder on financial reporting of firms listed in the Korean stock markets.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.83-97
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• 2014

This study examined the effects institutional block ownership on the stock market liquidity in Korean Stock Market. The two measures of institutional block ownership are used. They are the percentage of a stock owned by institutional blockholder and the number of institutional blockholder that own the stock. This study used the Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure to measure stock market liquidity. The results are as fellows. First, this study showed that the number of institutional blockholder is significantly negatively correlated with the Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure in the analysis which is used the whole data. But we found no a consistent results between the number of institutional blockholder and the Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure in the grouped institutional blockholder's number analysis. This indicates that the effects institutional blockholder on market liquidity is not simple. Second, this study showed that the percentage of a stock owned by institutional blockholder are negatively related with Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure, especially revealed statistically significant in the group 3(11.71%~17.38%) and group 4(7.45%~11.65%). This results suggest that the institutional blockholder have positive effect on the market liquidity in the group 3 and 4. Third, the significance of the percentage of institutional block ownership and the number of institutional block ownership in explaining illiquidity are more showed in the term of the global financial crisis(2008) than the before and the after of the global financial crisis.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.263-284
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• 1994

This study examines the monitoring effects of institutions, outside directors, and outside blockholders by seeing managers' selection of antitakeover measures. In this paper, we hypothesize that managers use antitakeover techniques to entrench themselves when they are not monitored closely. Consequently, we hypothesize that institutional ownership, outside membership on board of directors, outside directors ownership, and outside blockholder ownership are less in firms which adopt harmful antitakeover measures. This paper analyzes whether the degree of monitoring by institutions, outside directors, and outside blockholders influences managers' adoption of different types of takeover defenses. We find interesting empirical results. First, aggregate institutional ownership is positively correlated with the likelihood of antitakeover techniques adoption. This result implies that institutional investors are passive. Second, total and active blockholder owner-ship is higher at firms that do not propose any defensive tactics. passive blockholder owner-ship is highest at fair price firms but low at poison pills firms. Ownership concentration by outside investors increases monitoring and reduces agency problems. Thirid, outside board monitoring is ineffective.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.261-269
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• 2021

This study examines the effect of block diversity on the risk of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2017. To examine the effect of block diversity on corporate risk, we measure block diversity in terms of a single component, portfolio size, by referring to prior literature. This diversity component accounts for the differences in portfolio size across corporate blocks. In line with existing research on corporate risk, we consider several variables to measure corporate risk: volatility, beta, and idiosyncratic risk. The results show a negative relationship between the size of a block shareholder's portfolio and corporate risk. We also show no difference in the effect of block diversity on the corporate risk between KOSPI and KOSDAQ. This implies that the difference in portfolio size among corporate blocks reduces corporate risk. This may be due to the effect of inter-block monitoring activities in the Korean securities market, which benefits from block diversity. This empirical result supports previous studies that predicted that block diversity would have beneficial influences on firm monitoring in general. This study is significant in that it analyzes the relationship between block diversity and firm risk and provides relevant information to business practitioners and investors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.727-736
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• 2020

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship power distribution among several blockholders (contestability) and firm performance. We use a sample of 646 firms listed in the security markets of Korea from 2005 to 2007. Using different measures of contestability, we verify advance research literature by examining that, when power dispersion among several blockholders (contestability) increases, firm performance is enhanced. The results show that, when the possibility of a controlling coalition being formed among several blocks increases, the corporate value decreases. We also find that this relationship is even more significant in KOSDAQ. However, the smaller the competition of voting rights among blockholders, the higher the corporate performance in KOSPI. The reason for this seems to be that the two markets are different in terms of ownership and governance. This suggests that the effects of contestability among blockholders on firm performance depend on the type of the stock market. The results of this study expand the existing governance literature by analyzing the relationship between contestability among blockholders and firm performance in emerging markets such as Korea. Our findings contribute to policymakers and investors who are interested in the relationship between contestability of control and firm performance in the Korea stock market.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.287-296
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• 2021

This paper investigates the relationship between the ownership of the largest family blockholders and corporate risk. We also examine whether firms that belong to 30 main Chaebol groups lower corporate risk. We use panel analysis for companies listed on the Korea Exchange from 2005 to 2017. We use beta, volatility, and idiosyncratic risk as a proxy for corporate risk. We employ both the ownership of the largest family blockholders and firms that belong to 30 main Chaebol groups as a major independent variable. The results show that the ownership of the largest family blockholders is associated with low beta. In terms of the effects of the ownership of the largest family blockholders on beta, we find that a firm that belongs to the 30 main Chaebol group reinforces the lower beta. These results suggest that the ownership of the largest family blockholders and firms that belongs to 30 main Chaebol groups may be associated with low systematic risk in the Korean stock market. Our findings can provide meaningful information to investors and field officers who are interested in the relationship between firm risk and both the largest family blockholders' ownership and firms that belong to 30 main Chaebol groups.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.314-323
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• 2022

This study examines the effecs of National Pension Service blockholders on accounting conservatism. The sample consists of 10,117 non-banking firm-years listed in Korea Stock Exchange(KOSPI) during the period 2011 to 2018. The results of this study are as follows. First, it was found that companies in which the National Pension Service as a major shareholder hold more than 5% of the shares are less prone to conservative accounting treatment than those that do not. Second, such a negative relationship between investment by the National Pension Service and conservative accounting was consistently found even when the investment period of the National Pension Service was divided into short-term (less than 1 year) and long-term (more than 3 years). It is expected that the National Pension Service, the largest institutional investor in Korea, will be able to carry out meaningful management control activities on investment companies. As the monitoring function of the National Pension Service works effectively in the capital market, agency costs are reduced, and investors' demands for corporate conservative accounting have decreased.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.33 no.5
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• pp.171-184
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• 2014

This paper investigate the impact of external financing constraints(EFC) on the dividend policy(cash dividend ratio) and the impact of interaction of ownership structure((1)the percentage of shares held by external blockholder who owns at least 5% of equity(5% BHR), (2) the percentage of shares held by foreign investors(Foreign), (3) the percentage of shares by insider shareholders(Insider)) and external financing constraints on the dividend policy. The purpose mentioned above are empirically tested using 370 firm-year data listed on the Korean Exchange(KRX) with multiple regression method. Summarizing the results of analysis as following; Firstly, we find that EFC has negative relationship with cash dividend ratio. Secondly, interaction of 5% BHR and EFC has positive relationship with cash dividend ratio. Also, interaction of Foreign and EFC has positive relationship with cash dividend ratio. But, Insider and EFC has negative relationship with cash dividend ratio. This study contributes to research related to dividend policy by recognizing that ownership structure influences the dividend policy.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.73-80
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• 2020

Using 8,499 observations from 5 years-1,878 firms panel data during 2014 to 2018 in Korean stock exchanges, this study examines the impact of National Pension's ownership on corporate philanthropic giving. The empirical study finds that National Pension's ownership has positive relations with the extent of corporate philanthropic giving in terms of the amounts per employee, the expenditures with respect to total asset and total sales, implying that National Pension plays a monitoring role in promoting target firms to increase the extent of corporate philanthropic giving, which lead to increase in target firms' long-term values. The empirical study also finds that when National Pension is a blockholder holding more than 5% ownership in the target firms, it has positive relations with the extent of corporate philanthropic giving in terms of the amounts per employee, the expenditures with respect to total asset, implying that it exercises disciplinary roles on focal firms in promoting the extent of corporate philanthropic giving in order to increase target firms' long-term values. The results overall support that National Pension plays positive effects on target firms in promoting the extent of corporate philanthropic giving, which lead to increase in target firms' long-term values.