• Ocean and Polar Research
• /
• v.24 no.4
• /
• pp.501-524
• /
• 2002

Article 121 of the UNCLOS stipulates the regime of islands and grants different jurisdictions to islands and rocks. Especially, paragraph 3 gives different definitions and distinguishes the legal status of between islands and rocks. That is, rocks, which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life cannot have their own EEZ, continental shelf or the great-sphere maritime jurisdiction. In this paper various theories and state practicess on islands and rocks are examined with reference to Article 121 of UNCLOS. Also, the status of Dokdo as a rock or an island is examined in accordance with the interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS. National legislations, practices, and many scientific opinions are often contradictory and controversial with respect to the interpretation of Article 121 of the UNCLOS. However, it is believed that Article 121 of UNCLOS, particularly paragraph 3 has to be interpreted more strictly. That is because the highly developed modem scientific technology can be meaningless when the criteria of Article 121 of UNCLOS are to be inappropriately applied. Insular figures like ${\ulcorner}rocks{\lrcorner}$ could bring the inequitable effects disadvantageous toward the other party when the maritime delimitation is applied. Claiming and Intentionally extending maritime zone of a coastal states by assigning EEZ for small insular figures like ${\ulcorner}rocks{\lrcorner}$ is over-zealous nationalism which is illegal, and such practices must be recognized as actions bringing great harm to the neighboring nations and demise of the sprit of all mankind.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.36
• /
• pp.33-58
• /
• 2015

In 1996, China, Japan and the ROK all became the party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since then, the UNCLOS has been a fundamental basis for the resolution and management of maritime disputes amongst them. However, there still remain acrimonious disputes in the region. Resources nationalism and the revival of geopolitics aggravates the disputes particularly on sovereignty over disputed islands, maritime delimitation and the legal nature of military activities in other States' Exclusive Economic Zones. Under the circumstances, why have the demands for the conclusion of a regional agreement been raised in this region? A desirable regional agreement regarding ocean affairs should be compatible with the rights and obligations under the UNCLOS, a universal norm regarding ocean affairs. This paper will propose a desirable regional agreement by adopting an incremental approach.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
• /
• v.1
• /
• pp.91-96
• /
• 2006

International law provides for fundamental navigational rights called the right of transit passage in international straits as defined by UNCLOS. However, the Australian government published Marine Notice 8/2006 and the associated Part 54 of Australian Marine Orders which requires ships transiting the Torres Strait to engage the services of a pilot and imposes significant penalties for non-compliance on the basis of the IMO MEPC 133(53) which is just a resolution as a recommendation. This paper aims to study legal aspects in UNCLOS on the pilotage in the Torres Strait following the extension of the Great Barrier Reef PSSA neighbouring Australia.

• Proceedings of KOSOMES biannual meeting
• /
• 2018.06a
• /
• pp.183-183
• /
• 2018

• Strategy21
• /
• s.40
• /
• pp.131-143
• /
• 2016

On 12 July 2016, China's maritime claim to most of the South China Sea (SCS) based on the so-called nine-dash line was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning issues in the South China Sea including the legality of the so-called "nine-dashed line", the status of certain maritime features and their corresponding maritime entitlements, together with the lawfulness of certain actions by China which the Philppines, in a case brought in 2013, alleged were violations. As having the Tribunal determined that China's claim had no legal grounds in UNCLOS, thus undermining China's claims, and establishing that China has no exclusive legal rights to control the area roughly the size of India. There are some major implications from the Tribunal's ruling in the Arbitration award. These include implications on: how to delimit the maritime boundary in disputed waters, how to promote maritime confidence-building measures, how to safeguard maritime safety and security, and how to promote the rule of law in the SCS. Since its application of UNCLOS in East Asia, it has been obvious that the only way to resolve maritime disputes in the region is to build strong maritime cooperative partnerships under the auspices of the rule of law.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.41
• /
• pp.153-173
• /
• 2017

On 15 December 2015, China seized an underwater drone belonging to the U.S. in the South China Sea. The underwater drone was then about to be retrieved by the Bowditch, a U.S. naval ship.Although China returned the underwater drone to the U.S. on 20 December 2016, the incident resulted in the considerable controversy involving the use of underwater drones. The reason for this is that the seizure of the underwater drone happened in the exclusive economic zone (hereafter referred to as "EEZ") of the Philippines. Part XIII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as "UNCLOS") governs the matters of marine scientific research (hereafter referred to as "MSR"). If a State intends to use an underwater drone in the EEZ of another coastal State for the purpose of MSR, the former has to obtain the consent of the latter in accordance with relevant provisions included in Part XIII of the UNCLOS. However, it is not obvious whether the consent of a coastal State should be required to launch an underwater drone in the EEZ of the State for the purpose of hydrographic surveying or military surveying. Maritime powers such as the U.S. regard hydrographic surveying or military surveying as part of "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines" found in Article 58(1) of the UNCLOS, or part of the freedom of the high seas. This interpretation is not incompatible with the implications that the UNCLOS has. Nevertheless, Korea cannot accept this kind of interpretation that is supported by maritime powers. The freedom of hydrographic surveying or military surveying could imply that the EEZ of Korea would be full of underwater drones launched by China, Japan or even Russia. Hence, Korea should claim that the data collected for the purpose of MSR cannot be distinguished from that collected for the purpose of hydrographic surveying or military surveying. This means that hydrographic surveying or military surveying without the consent of a coastal State in the EEZ of the State should not be permitted.

• Ocean policy research
• /
• v.33 no.2
• /
• pp.147-181
• /
• 2018

Currently, we are living in the era of the 4th industrial revolution. In the field of shipping industry, the MASS is a revolutionary game changer in the making arising out of such an industrial and technical innovation in the pursuit of radically challenging the pre-existing system of a human-operated vessel. Given this trend, the entire maritime regulatory regime, which has been designed by, and intertwined with, human seaworthiness, abruptly faces the most unprecedented normative confrontations now and increasingly in the coming days. As the constitution of ocean, UNCLOS, provides, every flag state is obliged to effectively exercise its jurisdiction to secure technical and human seaworthiness. Moreover, the coastal state may institute protective proceedings against vessels in respect of any violations of its laws to protect its marine environment in maritime zones of the coastal state. Further, UNCLOS acknowledges that the port state's authority extends to take administrative measures to prevent sub-standard ships from sailing within the ports or offshore-terminals of the state. These three jurisdictional functions will be required to more closely interface with each other than ever over the legal and political implications created by MASS. Although states' jurisdictional nuances are significant in this present world tilting back to protectionism, there are few articles to present jurisdictional issues of states and conceivable normative discourse with regard to MASS. This articles visits potential jurisdictional conflicts underlying MASS and tries to strike balance between contradictory interpretive approaches under UNCLOS while it is undeniable that this doctrinal research tends to strive to find justifications within the current framework of international law.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.142-163
• /
• 2013

Ieodo is a submerged rock within a Korea's Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) in the East China Sea with its most shallow part about 4.6m below the sea level which has no specific rights for the EEZ delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that any coastal state has the rights to claim an EEZ that stretches up to 200 nautical miles from its shore, except where there is an overlap with a neighboring country's claims. Korea claims that Ieodo is within its EEZ as it sits on the Korean side of the equidistant line and the reef is located on the Korea section of the continental shelf. China does not recognize Korea's application of the equidistance principle and insists that Ieodo lies on its continental shelf. According to UNCLOS, Ieodo is located in international waters, rather than one country's EEZ as the two countries have failed to reach a final agreement over the delimitation of the maritime border. This study seeks to understand the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy(PLAN) strategy as main obstacles for the EEZ delimitation between Korea and China. PLAN's Strategy evolves from "coastal defense" to "offshore defence", since the late 1980s from a "coastal defence" strategy to an "offshore defence" strategy which would extend the perimeter of defence to between 200 nm and 400 nm from the coast. China's economic power has increased It's dependence on open trade routes for energy supplies and for its own imports and exports. China want secure Sea Lane. PLAN's "offshore defence" strategy combines the concept of active defence with the deployment of its military forces beyond its borders. China's navy try to forward base its units and to achieve an ocean going capability. China's navy expects to have a 'Blue Water' capability by 2050. China insists that coastal states do have a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs. China protests several times against US military forces operating within It's EEZ. The U.S. position is that EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. has a national interest in the preservation of freedom of navigation as recognized in customary international law of the sea and reflected in UNCLOS. U.S. insists that coastal states under UNCLOS do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. To be consistent with its demand that the U.S. cease performing military operations in china's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake any military operations in the waters of South Korea's EEZ. As such, to preserve its own security interests, China prefers a status quo policy and used strategic ambiguity on the Ieodo issue. PLAN's strategy of coastal defence has been transformed into offensive defence, Korea's EEZ can be a serious limitation to PLAN's operational plan of activities. Considering China'a view of EEZs, China do not want make EEZ delimitation agreement between Korea and China. China argues that the overlapping areas between EEZs should be handled through negotiations and neither side can take unilateral actions before an agreement is reached. China would prefer Ieodo sea zone as a international waters, rather than one country's EEZ.

• Ocean and Polar Research
• /
• v.44 no.2
• /
• pp.147-160
• /
• 2022

SRFC (Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission) requested to the ITLOS (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) an advisory opinion relating to the IUU (Illegl, Unreported, and Unregulated) fishing (Case No-21 of the ITLOS). Since, in the UNCLOS, there is no article authorizing the jurisdiction of the ITLOS full court's Advisory opinion, so various scholarly opinion wad divided. But ITLOS delivered its Advisory opinion confirming its jurisdictional competence over the Advisory proceedings with its legal opinion about the IUU issues. It opens new possibility of the alternative dispute settlement mechanism of the ITLOS through the advisory procedures. In reality, there has been a view that ICJ (International Court of Justice) could take the part of a kind of dispute settlement through its Advisory procedures. But the advisory procedures of the ITLOS, with no definite clause in UNCLOS about the advisory procedures, which provides more allowances for the function of advisory opinion as the alternative dispute settlement mechanism. ITLOS accepted the requests of the advisory opinion by the State parties through international organization or themselves directly. And the advisory opinion of the ITLOS aims the interpretation and application into the special issues-specially IUU fishing in Case No. 21 of the ITLOS-. Those factors could enable more enhanced role of the ITLOS as an alternative dispute settlement mechanism. But those possibility has contain risk of excessive and unlimited advisory role of the ITLOS. So it is important to focus on the restriction on the role of the State parties in the request of the advisory opinion to the ITLOS. In this regard it is meaningful that the ITLOS has suggested a kind of legal standing in the advisory procedures in that only coastal States could request the Advisory opinion about the IUU in their EEZ. Furthermore the discretionary power of the ITLOS in the Article 138 of the Rules of the Tribunal could curtail the abuse of the Advisory opinion initiated by the States parties of the UNCLOS. Under this framework, Advisory opinion could broaden more alternative option to the disputes between State parties of the UNCLOS in that after being delivered detailed interpretation of the UNCLOS about the specific issues, States parties could devote themselves to searching for flexible solution for the disputes between State parties. It could obtain legal explanation about the dispute under the Article 297 and Article 298 by detouring the jurisdiction limits through advisory procedures.

• Ocean and Polar Research
• /
• v.28 no.3
• /
• pp.259-272
• /
• 2006

The 1982 UNCLOS provided very detailed provisions on marine scientific research and gave coastal stale jurisdiction to regulate marine scientific research in its EEZ. However, due to lack of definition and criteria of MSR, there are some different views, even conflicts, regarding legal Pounds for governing hydrographic surveys and oceanographic data collection by one state in the EEZs of other states. Some coastal states argue that those activities should only be conducted in the EEZ of other states with the consent of the coastal state while it is the opinion of other states, including the U.S.A., that those activities can be conducted freely in the EEZ. This paper reviews different views and recent developments on the issue and suggests some recommendations for future work of the Korean government related to the activities.